Live Ransomware samples Subject, Sender August/July 2016 Switzerland

An overview what Swiss hospitals get in these days?

If you still don't get it and understand how critical this point is:

  • Budget is NOT the limit to use an attachment Analyze sandbox or not.
  • Modern version of Cerber SPREAD through Share Credentials from Microsoft Windows and jump to all clients. A customer with 13'000 clients was infected in Asia in a few hours.
  • If you are above 100+ employees or if you think your business is important BUY a Sandbox for Mail Analyze and use Mcafee TIE/ATD for Files.
  • If you are too small > No solution. Do not accept attachment anymore! The step to take all Mail Flow and Exchange to the cloud will not help you! Spend massive money in security or take the risk that you close your business once because of Ransomware

http://www.scmagazine.com/microsoft-office-365-hit-with-massive-cerber-ransomware-attack-report/article/505845/ (June 2016)

Updated: Millions of Microsoft Office 365 users were potentially exposed to a massive zero-day Cerber ransomware attack last week that not only included a ransom note, but an audio warning informing victims that their files were encrypted.

Steven Toole, a researcher for the cloud-security firm Avanan, blogged that his company saw the first attack roll in at 6:44 a.m. on June 22 and that at least 57 percent of all Office 365 customers on Avanan's platform received at least one phishing attempt that contained the infected attachment and Avanan extrapolated that the same number of all Office 365 users were involved. While Avanan did not supply a specific number of those possibly hit, Microsoft reported in its first quarter 2016 earnings report that there are 18.2 million Office 365 subscribers.

http://www.butsch.ch/post/Ransomware-Schweiz-Mcafee-TIE-Threat-Intelligence-Exchange-im-Einsatz.aspx

http://www.butsch.ch/post/RansomwareDeutschlandSchweiz-Healthcare-Deutscher-Bund-warnt-und-reagiert.aspx

http://www.butsch.ch/post/200216-Ransomware-Locky-Trojan-Germany-high-infection-rates.aspx

https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/08/locky_ransomwaredis.html

 

The malware was sent from THOSE company's listed. The sender address where spoofed/Forged.

Date

Time

Client

Message

From

27.07.2016

04:44:34

mx2.ait.ac.at [62.218.164.132]

The file Alphabet Incorporation.docx is infected with MSWord/Phishing.C97F!phish.

anja.koengeter@ait.ac.at

16.08.2016

13:44:58

[62.152.169.139]

The file dhl_bestellung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

buro@dhl.com

20.07.2016

13:40:36

mo4-p03-ob.smtp.rzone.de [81.169.146.172]

The file Paketnummer0221036778.zip is infected with JS/Ransom.AP!tr.

c.zaehringer@microtracer.de

16.08.2016

13:31:43

fysiohoevensevld.demon.nl [80.100.200.39]

The file dhl_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

donotreply@dhl.com

18.07.2016

17:34:31

host-212-68-196-182.dynamic.voo.be [212.68.196.182]

The file coop.ch_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

17:30:10

mail.grosvenor-carpets.co.uk [91.135.7.205]

The file coop_bestellung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

17:20:25

91.98.235.122.pol.ir [91.98.235.122]

The file coop_ch_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

17:09:24

gw.paph.co.uk [82.33.219.82]

The file coop.ch_quitung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

17:07:35

[82.79.49.226]

The file coop_bestellung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

17:01:47

gw.paph.co.uk [82.33.219.82]

The file coop.ch_bestellung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

16:54:46

gw.paph.co.uk [82.33.219.82]

The file coop_quitung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

16:52:15

[82.78.203.146]

The file coop.ch_quitung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

16:39:59

82-76-211-44.rdsnet.ro [82.76.211.44]

The file coop.ch_bestellung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

16:39:40

gw.paph.co.uk [82.33.219.82]

The file coop.ch_bestellung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

16:07:52

82-76-211-44.rdsnet.ro [82.76.211.44]

The file coop_bestellung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

14:45:18

host-48-166-108-91.as10.ldn.uk.sharedband.net [91.108.166.48]

The file coop.ch_zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

14:29:21

host-212-68-196-182.dynamic.voo.be [212.68.196.182]

The file coop_ch_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

13:49:33

91-189-60-54.riz.pl [91.189.60.54]

The file coop_zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

13:36:58

static.imatel.es [91.200.117.76]

The file coop_zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

18.07.2016

13:13:35

91-189-60-54.riz.pl [91.189.60.54]

The file coop_ch_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

info@coop.ch

15.08.2016

15:41:43

static-84-42-159-115.net.upcbroadband.cz [84.42.159.115]

The file bestellung_15_08_2016.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

info@credit-suisse.com

15.08.2016

15:18:33

[193.85.159.72]

The file rechnung_15_08.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

info@credit-suisse.com

15.08.2016

13:19:41

148.63.249.5.rev.vodafone.pt [5.249.63.148]

The file bestellung_15_08.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

info@credit-suisse.com

15.08.2016

13:12:11

148.63.249.5.rev.vodafone.pt [5.249.63.148]

The file zahlung_15.08.2016.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

info@credit-suisse.com

16.08.2016

12:12:37

fysiohoevensevld.demon.nl [80.100.200.39]

The file Zahlung_DHL.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

info@dhl.com

24.08.2016

06:39:32

ncr-100-66.primenet.in [203.115.100.66]

The file PRIVATE CASH.zip is infected with W32/Inject.ABHZO!tr.

info@infobitsystem.com

09.08.2016

17:23:43

88.250.40.151.static.ttnet.com.tr [88.250.40.151]

The file zahlung_09.08.2016.docx is infected with Malware_Generic.P0.

info@post.ch

09.08.2016

17:04:24

[88.208.35.108]

The file zahlung_09.08.2016.docx is infected with Malware_Generic.P0.

info@post.ch

09.08.2016

16:57:18

[86.34.227.40]

The file quittung_09.08.2016.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

info@post.ch

09.08.2016

16:36:59

80.179.6.66.static.012.net.il [80.179.6.66]

The file zahlung_09.08.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

info@post.ch

09.08.2016

14:51:07

llamentin-656-2-209.w81-248.abo.wanadoo.fr [81.248.1.209]

The file zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

info@post.ch

09.08.2016

16:08:59

comox.a-enterprise.ch [62.12.150.213]

The file rechnung 09_Aug.docm is infected with WM/Obfuscated.V!tr.

m12e@bluewin.ch

09.08.2016

15:46:01

zhhdzmsp-smtp14.bluewin.ch [195.186.136.32]

The file rechnung 09_Aug.docm is infected with WM/Obfuscated.V!tr.

migrol.stans@bluewin.ch

19.07.2016

14:45:56

[189.126.194.34]

The file migros_rechnung.doc is infected with WM/Agent.DWX!tr.

no-reply@migros.ch

19.07.2016

14:39:17

fysiohoevensevld.demon.nl [80.100.200.39]

The file migros_zahlung.doc is infected with WM/Agent.DWX!tr.

no-reply@migros.ch

19.07.2016

14:37:47

[181.49.220.34]

The file migros_quittung.doc is infected with WM/Agent.DWX!tr.

no-reply@migros.ch

19.07.2016

14:25:22

[181.49.220.34]

The file migros_quittung.doc is infected with WM/Agent.DWX!tr.

no-reply@migros.ch

19.07.2016

13:47:29

[181.49.220.34]

The file migros_bestellung.doc is infected with WM/Agent.DWX!tr.

no-reply@migros.ch

20.07.2016

17:30:54

mail.ofekltd.co.il [81.218.132.237]

The file paypal_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

noreply@paypal.com

20.07.2016

16:23:30

mail.ofekltd.co.il [81.218.132.237]

The file paypal_zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

noreply@paypal.com

28.07.2016

15:58:43

ms1.webland.ch [92.43.217.101]

The file copier@asa-spitaeler.ch_20160720076718.docm is infected with WM/Agent.BJC!tr.dldr.

no-reply=23=copier@asa-spitaeler.ch

16.08.2016

15:38:36

fysiohoevensevld.demon.nl [80.100.200.39]

The file dhl_packet_16.08.2016.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

paket@dhl.com

16.08.2016

13:14:02

[62.152.169.139]

The file dhl_packet_16_08_2016.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.AAP!tr.dldr.

reply@dhl.com

27.07.2016

14:00:52

expertno-analit-zentr.ch.govorit.ru [89.221.61.75]

The file Paypal_Zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@paypal.ch

27.07.2016

13:53:50

expertno-analit-zentr.ch.govorit.ru [89.221.61.75]

The file Paypal_Zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@paypal.ch

20.07.2016

16:12:32

host81-137-222-56.in-addr.btopenworld.com [81.137.222.56]

The file paypal_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@paypal.com

20.07.2016

15:54:40

cpc87465-finc19-2-0-cust332.4-2.cable.virginm.net [82.17.37.77]

The file paypal_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@paypal.com

20.07.2016

15:20:16

cpc87465-finc19-2-0-cust332.4-2.cable.virginm.net [82.17.37.77]

The file paypal_zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@paypal.com

20.07.2016

14:41:39

lmontsouris-657-1-208-29.w80-11.abo.wanadoo.fr [80.11.48.29]

The file paypal_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@paypal.com

21.07.2016

16:38:27

166.109.94.80.dynamic.monaco.mc [80.94.109.166]

The file zurich.com_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

21.07.2016

16:04:30

166.109.94.80.dynamic.monaco.mc [80.94.109.166]

The file zurich.com_bestellung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

21.07.2016

16:01:00

82-137-118-134.ip.btc-net.bg [82.137.118.134]

The file zurich.com_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

21.07.2016

15:58:54

host81-133-60-254.in-addr.btopenworld.com [81.133.60.254]

The file zurich.com_quittung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

21.07.2016

15:34:28

82-137-118-134.ip.btc-net.bg [82.137.118.134]

The file zurich.com_zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

21.07.2016

15:08:05

166.109.94.80.dynamic.monaco.mc [80.94.109.166]

The file zurich.com_zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

21.07.2016

14:13:25

166.109.94.80.dynamic.monaco.mc [80.94.109.166]

The file zurich.com_quittung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

21.07.2016

13:28:41

mail.aretilaw.com [81.4.136.98]

The file zurich.com_bestellung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

21.07.2016

13:16:01

mail.aretilaw.com [81.4.136.98]

The file zurich.com_quittung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

21.07.2016

13:04:58

166.109.94.80.dynamic.monaco.mc [80.94.109.166]

The file zurich.com_rechnung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

21.07.2016

13:00:48

host81-133-60-254.in-addr.btopenworld.com [81.133.60.254]

The file zurich.com_quittung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

service@zurich.com

26.07.2016

11:36:01

lputeaux-657-1-16-200.w90-63.abo.wanadoo.fr [90.63.199.200]

The file viagogo.com_zahlung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

ticketalerts@info.viagogo.com

20.07.2016

13:17:02

[81.28.170.24]

The file zoo.ch_quittung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

zoo@zoo.ch

20.07.2016

12:54:45

[81.28.170.24]

The file zoo.ch_quittung.docx is infected with JS/Nemucod.C060!tr.dldr.

zoo@zoo.ch

Exchange: Public Folder / System Folder replicate which ones?

This is an often question we had seen and there is a KB which gives a good overview which folders are from what version of Exchange.

Sadly The Microsoft Script ".\AddReplicaToPFRecursive.ps1 -server "SBSERVER2" -TopPublicFolder "\non_ipm_subtree" -ServerToAdd "SBSERVER2"" does not handle that KB or has the knowledge what to replicate and not.

We had a case where the OLD Exchange 2010 "System Folders" under "\NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1" was replicated from 2010 to a replaced DAG member 2010. The customer also had

Mcafee Security for Exchange 8.5 P1 running which lets you exclude Public Folder for Mailbox Scanning but NOT on the HUB function. Because we had a file filter for .JS the replication files triggered an alert.

 

Here is the alert because of the JS extension of replication of old Exchange 2000 public folder structure:

Datum/Zeit gesendet

  

08/04/2016 03:04:13

Betreffend

  

Folder Content Backfill Response

Von

  

PF12@butsch.ch

An

  

PF13@butsch.ch

Das wurde gemacht

  

Deleted

Grund

  

File Filter; File Filter; File Filter; File Filter; File Filter; File Filter; File Filter; File Filter; File Filter; File Filter; File Filter (ctrl_Tree20.js; ctrl_View20.js; dlg_anr.js; dlg_ANR20.js; dlg_gal.js; dlg_GAL20.js; dlg_MoveCopy20.js; dlg_NewFolder20.js; dlg_Options20.js; dlg_recurrence.js; dlg_Recurrence20.js)

Dateigrösse

  

329113

Datei/File

  

ctrl_Tree20.js; ctrl_View20.js; dlg_anr.js; dlg_ANR20.js; dlg_gal.js; dlg_GAL20.js; dlg_MoveCopy20.js; dlg_NewFolder20.js; dlg_Options20.js; dlg_recurrence.js; dlg_Recurrence20.js

Server auf dem dies gemacht wurde

  

SBBCARGEX22

Task

  

OnAccess (Transport)

McAfee DAT welches verwendet wurde

  

8246.0000

 

 

Exchange OLE DB Provider

https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa142634(v=exchg.65).aspx

EXOLEDB Introduction

EXOLEDB creates a number of system folders under the NON_IPM_SUBTREE during the Accept Clients phase of message database (MDB) initialization. Some of the folders remain for historic reasons, but most have useful purposes. If the folders are deleted, it can affect the server. None of these folders should be replicated. The folders that are created include the following:

  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Default
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1\exchweb
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1\exchweb\controls
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1\exchweb\img
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1\exchweb\views
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\StoreEvents\
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\StoreEvents\GlobalEvents
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\StoreEvents\Internal
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\OWAScratchPad

In all cases, subfolders named with the GUID correspond to the MDB object with the same GUID.

The first folders created are the schema folders.

Schema-Root

The following list introduces the schema-root:

  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\

    This was introduced in Exchange 2000 Server.

  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Default

    This was introduced in Exchange 2000 Server Service Pack 1 (SP1).

  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\

    This was introduced in Exchange 2000 Server SP1.

  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1

    This was introduced in Exchange 2000 Server SP1.

The following shows a typical schema path for a public MDB:

  • File://.BackOfficeStorage/<domain>/<TLHName>/NON_IPM_SUBTREE/schema-root/microsoft/exchangeV1

The private MDB schema path is under the system attendant mailbox.

EXOLEDB supports multiple schemas, or property type definitions. These folders support the Exchange Web Store development platform. The idea was that folder items could reference various versions of the schema and exist alongside each other. At one point in Exchange 2000 Server, schema files were in the schema root folder, and changes to the schema effectively propagated to all items. Because this lead to problems in the application development workspace, where each item needed to be handled to remove or add props as appropriate, Microsoft adopted a versioning method. Under schema-root, Microsoft creates subfolders with application and version elements to allow effectively seamless upgrades. EXOLEDB watches the schema folders for changes, so that it can propagate the entries, dump the schema cache, and repopulate as processing occurs. The \schemaroot\default folder is where normal folder items obtain their schema, and the schema-root folder is flagged as pointing to the ExchangeV1 folder. EXOLEDB populates the schema entries from the .xml files, which are processed by an event sink, EXSCHEMA.EXE. The schema event sink binding cannot be deleted or removed, because it does not have an entry in the EventBindings folder like most events.

EXCHWEB, Views, IMG, and Controls

The following list introduces EXCHWEB, views, IMG, and controls:

\NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1\exchweb

\NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1\exchweb\controls

\NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1\exchweb\img

\NON_IPM_SUBTREE\schema-root\Microsoft\exchangeV1\exchweb\views

Introduced in Exchange 2000 Server SP1, these items were not populated in Exchange 2000 Server Service Pack 3 (SP3), and they are not populated in Exchange Server 2003.

For the local store to open items that reference Microsoft Outlook® Web Access control functionality, the files must be in a folder that can be synchronized. These folders once contained copies of the Web data for Outlook Web Access to allow LIS stored items to open, but have never actually been used outside of LIS.

Next, EXOLEDB starts the event binding system, which creates StoreEvents.

 

StoreEvents

All store event folders described in the following list have been present since Exchange 2000 Server:

  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\StoreEvents\
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\StoreEvents\GlobalEvents
  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\StoreEvents\Internal

This is the event binding folder, where EXOLEDB stores information on events built to a specific MDB. At startup, EXOLEDB must enumerate the events here, which can lead to long store startup times with large event sink numbers. Exchange Server 2003 performance in this area is greatly improved, but time to mount an MDB is still affected by the number of rows. Each binding is validated for class, having a valid event method, such as onsave or ontimer, valid clsid, and sink parameters. Events with a match class of ANY can only be registered in the GlobalEvents subfolder.

After creating the schema folders and starting the event bindings system, EXOLEDB creates the Outlook Web Access scratch pad.

OWAScratchPad

 

The OWAScratchPad was introduced in Exchange 2000 Server SP1. It appears as follows:

  • \NON_IPM_SUBTREE\OWAScratchPad

Posts have to start out somewhere to have attachments, and for public store logons, that place is the Outlook Web Access scratch pad. Because Distributed Authoring and Versioning (DAV) does not cross MDB operations, you need a point on every mailbox where you can always write posts to, so that you can support adding attachments. The posts are staged in the OWAScratchPad until all attachments are added, or they are saved. The size limit on the Outlook Web Access scratch pad controls the size of attachments that can be added through Outlook Web Access. Attempts to post larger messages should result in the following error:

  • This item exceeds the maximum size defined for this folder and cannot be saved. Contact your administrator to have the folder limits increased.

The size of OWAScratchPad is always reset to 1 megabyte (MB) at EXOLEDB initialization if the registry key HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\MSExchangeWeb\OWA REG_DWORD value "Message Size Limit" is not set. This is required for Microsoft SharePoint® Portal Server, because EXOLEDB has no idea if you are running in magma mode.

Outlook Web Access posts to the scratch pad are done in flat URL format, meaning they directly reference the folder and message. This is to support deep vroots where the friendly URL might be too long.

EXOLEDB Folders FAQ

Consider the following frequently asked questions (FAQs).

What causes duplicate system folders?

There are two categories for this question:

  • Active Directory objects   When a store is deleted, you have no way to tell Active Directory that the public folder objects went away. Then, when folders are re-created, they do not get attached to the corresponding Directory Service objects. New Directory Service objects are created.
  • Actual folders   If the folders are set to replicate, and the store in question is deleted, EXOLEDB will re-create the folders on startup, and replication can then create a second duplicate of any such folders. This causes problems with event bindings. Deleting the duplicate folders through friendly URLs is dangerous, because the two will often have duplicate friendly URLs.

Why do folders get strange names?

When the number of system folders with the same number grows, a random number is appended to the Directory Service proxy to make it unique, resulting in names like controls12345678.

Why can I not delete folders?

If you were to delete the folders, EXOLEDB would put them back. Also, most of these folders have uses that will adversely affect the operation of the server if not present.

How do I fix missing schema folders?

If schema folders are missing, that is, not present under the ipm subtree, setting the following registry key to a REG_DWORD value of 0, causes the schema to be repopulated:

HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\MSExchangeIS\Parameters\Schema\<MDBGUID>

What permissions are used on schema folders?

EXOLEDB automatically grants everyone read access to schema folders. This access control list (ACL) could be modified, but would be deleted if schema propagation were re-triggered.

Do you need to replicate those folders when servers are decommissioned?

You do not have to replicate folder content as part of the replicate system folders procedures.

For More Information

For more information, see the following Exchange blog entry:

Exchange: Powershell list all user who have a Forward or Redirect active

 

Problem:

In Exchange 2010 users are able to forward E-Mail themself to an external private account. This is a problem because of compliance and if you don't have a DLP (Data Lost Prevention).

There are ways to prevent this (With a Mail Control Rule > Transport rule) or with a DRAC permission set. However then also some technical accounts which HAVE to mailcopy external may get targeted. See below at end for a solution or at least a direction to go.

 

This is what we talk about in Exchange2010 GUI.

Here is how to find out which users in the Organization have such a forward or Redirect active.

Powershell command:

Forwards

foreach ($i in (Get-Mailbox -ResultSize unlimited)) { Get-InboxRule -Mailbox $i.DistinguishedName | where {$_.ForwardTo} | fl MailboxOwnerID,Name,ForwardTo >> d:\edv\exchange_Forward.txt }

Delegates

foreach ($i in (Get-Mailbox -ResultSize unlimited)) { Get-InboxRule -Mailbox $i.DistinguishedName | where {$_.ReDirectTo} | fl MailboxOwnerID,Name,RedirectTo >> d:\edv\exchange_Redirect.txt }

Another query which does not catch all

Get-Mailbox | Where {$_.ForwardingAddress -ne $null} | Select Name, ForwardingAddress, DeliverToMailboxAndForward

https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/lystavlen/2012/04/10/how-to-prevent-internal-users-from-autoforwaring-mails-to-external-recipients/

Prevent with RBAC from (Sike Fogarty - BPOS Support)

  1. New-ManagementRole -Name "Disable-Auto-Forward" -Parent MyBaseOptions
    Set-ManagementRoleEntry "Disable-Auto-ForwardSet-Mailbox" -Parameters DeliverToMailboxAndForward,ForwardingAddress,ForwardingSmtpAddress –RemoveParameter
    Set-ManagementRoleEntry "Disable-Auto-ForwardNew-Inboxrule" -Parameters ForwardAsAttachmentTo,ForwardTo,RedirectTo –RemoveParameter

    Sign into the EAC click on Permissions > User Roles > Click on the Plus sign to add an additional Role Assignment Policy naming it whatever you want and under MyBaseOptions you will see the Disable-Auto-Forward option that you will want to place a check mark in. Save the Role Assignment Policy.

    Assign the Role Assignment Policy to the user(s) desired.

     

     

     

Exchange: Activesync 1053 Event, 4003 Error 2007/2010/2013/2016 Adminsholder

 

Activesync with Exchange 2013 does not work, ADMINSHOLDER or ADMINCOUNT Flag (an old bad friend)

ERROR YOU SEE: Access+is+denied.%0d%0aActive+directory+response%3a+00000005%3a+SecErr%3a+DSID-03152612%2c+problem+4003+(INSUFF%5FACCESS%5FRIGHTS)%2c+data+0%0a_

Events:

 

We just had a user with Activesync with a user migrated from 2007 to 2013. The user was fresh made on 2007 and migrated forth and back a few times.

https://testconnectivity.microsoft.com/

Did show all info he can get and one thing triggered alerts with us. 4003+(INSUFF%5FACCESS%5FRIGHTS)

This was back 2003 > 2007 Migrations but comes again and again. Strange thing is that the test user account is only in a few groups and we never made him LOCALADMIN. But one group still seems to trigger the ADMINSHOLDER flags which should protect special accounts like "IISUSER" or Administrator.

Then we did see why. If the user is member of the group "PRINT OPERATORS" this will be the case.

So GPO, Activesync and many other things will not work. This has been mentioned here:

https://technet.microsoft.com/de-de/magazine/2009.09.sdadminholder.aspx

 

 

http://www.butsch.ch/post/Migrated-NT42000-users-are-unable-to-ActiveSync-with-Exchange-Code-0x85010014.aspx

http://www.butsch.ch/post/Exchange-2003-3e-2007-3e-2010-User-Move-Request-fails-ADMINCOUNT3d1-INSUFF_ACCESS_RIGHTS.aspx

Resolution:

FIX the Inheritance of the account and all will work fine. See our other two posts on how to do that.

 

Activesync Log from https://testconnectivity.microsoft.com/

 

  

blUh4pH%2b19L4b%2fRk6uRZ%2bwFDxipa3umOc5NWKd8j3WZE%2f1rztOVQr3A7yqhQbWsCubcT0xJwV4JpO6fVK4ruS7rFkPgTuafoTzZOwv5kvn2wZAkGBr1hGm6NGz8%2fo4vFol0hWLVSJE3%2fX78fmSReawv4CBVixAAzyTR%2bm65WPSw86qwPxjfVseQiOrJ9qzUR8%2bPztEYmDjqvAfiVSNT6ouXwZf8%2fIpLnSalOyvp6n73yvkLu9rfgOsaQxOzJAX1TueDMkuiGV1EsG6HEYy3lD0Mdxo40pRRBknDTp58DusHBvAN8ud7YydsWys9YscJ5Agm9F2a7b6qIT%2bZ%2frM9%2btPQRyan97mInwoRsp1cgvsaffQtFPq9%2b%2fUjmh5g4UMvjYsM%2fVzVR2Of0c43FBQRBOkBfuavQW%2fwf%2fpr8BtFs28meQ0AAA%3d%3d_S111_Error:ADOperationException1%3aActive+Directory+operation+failed+on+MUNWDC1.butsch.ch.+This+error+is+not+retriable.+Additional+information%3a+Access+is+denied.%0d%0aActive+directory+response%3a+00000005%3a+SecErr%3a+DSID-03152612%2c+problem+4003+(INSUFF%5FACCESS%5FRIGHTS)%2c+data+0%0a_Mbx:EXCHANGE2013BUTSCH.butsch.ch_Dc:MUNWDC1.butsch.ch_Throttle0_SBkOffD:L%2f-470_DBL7_DBS1_CmdHC-1477255686_TmRcv08:05:50.2747716_TmSt08:05:50.2747716_TmDASt08:05:50.4310224_TmPolSt08:05:50.4622759_TmExSt08:05:50.4935244_TmExFin08:05:50.9622794_TmFin08:05:51.0716528_TmCmpl08:06:10.27494_ActivityContextData:ActivityID%3d5eeffb0c-62d3-46fe-994c-X-DiagInfo: EXCHANGE2013BUTSCH

X-BEServer: EXCHANGE2013BUTSCH

Cache-Control: private

Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8

Set-Cookie: ClientId=IARSMT0ZIEEVVIXDSSW; expires=Thu, 18-May-2017 08:05:50 GMT; path=/; HttpOnly,X-BackEndCookie=S-1-5-21-4456168801-1912567065-1745900225-5325=u56Lnp2ejJqBysnJysyZzJzSz5maztLLnZvO0sabnszSncrHms3JzZ7Jm8zIgYHNz87J0s/J0s7Iq8/Hxc/Jxc7P; expires=Fri, 17-Jun-2016 08:06:10 GMT; path=/Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync; secure; HttpOnly

Server: Microsoft-IIS/8.5

X-AspNet-Version: 4.0.30319

X-Powered-By: ASP.NET

X-FEServer: EXCHANGE2013BUTSCH

 

Get a list of all user who have such a behaviour:

Windows Server 2008R2, blaue Powershell aufmachen

Import-Module ActiveDirectory

Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter "(objectcategory=person)(samaccountname=*)(admincount=1)"

Solution:

REMOVE the ADMINCOUNT = 1 FLAG with ADSEDIT on DC

Change to <NOT SET> with CLEAR BUTTON on the account whjich has problems with IPHONE / ANDROID or any Activesync Device.

Open the User in ADUAC Console

Activesync should work now again

Important: You have 15 Minutes TO do both steps a) ADSEDIT b) And Security Inheritance correct.

 

Exchange 2007 > 2013 Migration, Braindump / things used

Here are some steps and scripts we used for Exchange 2007 > 2013 Transition (Migration > It's the same ;-)

Exchange 2007 side, Get Size and items in each box to migrate

[PS] D:\edv>Get-MailboxStatistics | Sort-Object TotalItemSize -Descending | ft D

isplayName,@{label="TotalItemSize(KB)";expression={$_.TotalItemSize.Value.ToKB()

}},ItemCount

 

 

 

MOVE of Exchange Mailboxes (If you move one DO not forget to REMOVE the Move-request (Esp. if you want to move back to 2007 in worst case for a user)

Get-MoveRequest

Get-MoveRequest | Get-MoveRequestStatistics

 

 

Remove-MoveRequest 2007ch

Get-MoveRequest -movestatus completed | remove-moverequest

 

----------------------------------------------------------

Auf 2007 zurueck:

new-moverequest -identity 2007ch -targetdatabase "exchange2007\sg1\mb1"

----------------------------------------------------------

Von 2007 auf 2013:

new-moverequest -identity user1 -targetdatabase "mdb01ch"

new-moverequest –identity user2 -targetdatabase "mdb01ch"

Check Health and read about theat before you start the MIGRATION (maybe you will not start then at all and stop and move to 2010)

 

 

Check if the 2013/2016 is running?

 

Get-HealthReport -Server exchange2013| where { $_.alertvalue -ne "Healthy" }

Get-MonitoringItemIdentity -Identity HubTransport -Server exchange2013 | ft Identity,ItemType,Target Resource -autosize

Get-ServerHealth -Identity munexc1 -HealthSet "HubTransport" | where { $_.alertvalue -ne "Healthy" } | fl Name

Get-ServerComponentState -Identity exchange2013

----------------------------------------------------------

 

Problem large growing DIAG / Health Logfiles are migration of 50 users and 3 day runtime

 

(IF you are new to Exchange DO NOT Delete Any Transaction Logfiles like below yellow)

 

 

The Diag Below YOU COULD delete carefully. Start with LARGE.

Don't start reading about Exchange 2013/2016 Health sets or you stop using Exchange 2013… ;-)

 

 

Here are some batch scripts to do that automatic:

 

https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Task-Scheduler-to-cleanup-25047622#content

Clean DIAG Logs

@echo off

:: Diagnostic Logfiles Remove

if Exist "D:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\Logging" forfiles.exe /p "D:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\Logging" /s /m *.log /d -2 /c "cmd /c del @file"

ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 60000 > nul

if Exist "D:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\Logging\Diagnostics\DailyPerformanceLogs" forfiles.exe /p "D:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\Logging\Diagnostics\DailyPerformanceLogs" /s /m *.* /d -2 /c "cmd /c del @file"

ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 60000 > nul

:: forfiles.exe /p "c:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles" /s /m *.log /d -2 /c "cmd /c del @file"

:: ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 60000 > nul

Exit

 

Exchange Activesync Recycle

Do this for all users who were migrated and use Activesync

Also check ADMINSHOLDER ( ADMOINCOUNT) FLAG!

http://www.butsch.ch/post/Migrated-NT42000-users-are-unable-to-ActiveSync-with-Exchange-Code-0x85010014.aspx

http://www.butsch.ch/post/Activesync-with-Exchange-2013-does-not-work-ADMINSHOLDER-Flag-(an-old-bad-friend).aspx

#Use this script to recycle IIS Application Pools to overcome Exchange 2013 SP1 ActiveSync bug for migrated users

 

$CASServers = Get-ClientAccessServer | where {$_.WorkloadManagementPolicy -ne $null}

 

#Loop through each CAS2013 and recycle the IIS App Pools

foreach ($CAS in $CASServers) {

Write-Host "Recycling App Pools on $CAS..."

$appPool = Get-WmiObject -Authentication PacketPrivacy -Impersonation Impersonate -ComputerName $CAS -namespace "root/MicrosoftIISv2" -class IIsApplicationPool | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "W3SVC/AppPools/MSExchangeAutodiscoverAppPool" }

$appPool.Recycle()

$appPool = Get-WmiObject -Authentication PacketPrivacy -Impersonation Impersonate -ComputerName $CAS -namespace "root/MicrosoftIISv2" -class IIsApplicationPool | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq "W3SVC/AppPools/MSExchangeSyncAppPool" }

$appPool.Recycle()

}

 

OR MANUAL:

Do an IISRESET (Thats is not the same as above!!!!) Just a base step!

If that does not work > Also recycle the IIS folders and Reboot the Exchange.

Open IIS Konsole

Go to "Application Pools"

  • On right side "Select" Recycle
  • From "Defaultpool" downwards to "MSexchagesyncappool" press Recycle RIGHT side in IIS console

   

  

 

Dump all permission of the Exchange Virtual Directory (iis). This will help to get an overview of the permission set on IIS and within Exchange.

http://www.butsch.ch/post/Exchange-20132016.aspx

The Russian blog has an excellent description of this script:

http://sysmagazine.com/posts/204454/

http://msbro.ru/index.php/archives/4705

 get-website | ForEach-Object -Process {

$xSite="IIS:\sites\"+$_.Name

cd $xSite

$xSite

$myWebApp=get-webApplication

$myWebApp | Format-Table -AutoSize Path ,

@{Label= "anonim:" ; Expression = {(Get-WebConfigurationProperty -Filter /system.webServer/security/authentication/anonymousAuthentication -Name Enabled -PSPath $xSite -location $_.Path).value }},

@{Label= "Basic:"; Expression = {(Get-WebConfigurationProperty -Filter /system.webServer/security/authentication/basicAuthentication -Name Enabled -PSPath $xSite -location $_.Path).value }},

@{Label= "ClientCert:"; Expression = {(Get-WebConfigurationProperty -Filter /system.webServer/security/authentication/clientCertificateMappingAuthentication -Name Enabled -PSPath $xSite -location $_.Path).value }},

@{Label= "Digest:"; Expression = {(Get-WebConfigurationProperty -Filter /system.webServer/security/authentication/digestAuthentication -Name Enabled -PSPath $xSite -location $_.Path).value }},

@{Label= "IIS client Cert:"; Expression = {(Get-WebConfigurationProperty -Filter /system.webServer/security/authentication/iisClientCertificateMappingAuthentication -Name Enabled -PSPath $xSite -location $_.Path).value }},

@{Label= "Windows"; Expression = {(Get-WebConfigurationProperty -Filter /system.webServer/security/authentication/windowsAuthentication -Name Enabled -PSPath $xSite -location $_.Path).value }},

@{Label= "SSL Flags"; Expression = {(Get-WebConfigurationProperty -Filter /system.webServer/security/access -Name * -PSPath $xSite -location $_.Path).SSLflags }}

}